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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
"COERCION"
ROBERT G. WECLEW*
Considering the numerous factual situations wherein the Supreme
Court could have found violation of the first amendment's estab-
lishment clause, as it is absorbed by the fourteenth amendment, it is
significant that the Court to date has found violation on only three
occasions.' It is significant that these violations have basic similarities,
and the decisions are fairly recent. Although the decisions purport to
rest solely on the establishment clause, manifestations of the free exer-
cise clause appear necessary to buttress and explain the Court's deci-
sions. "Establishment" in 1963 still finds it difficult to stand squarely
on its own. The three decisions all involve elementary school children
attending public schools wherein religious exercises were required or
permitted by state or local authority on school property with the right
of excusal on the part of those whose parents did not desire their
participation. The children in each instance were required to attend
school by virtue of a compulsory school attendance law.
The Court's initial concern with "liberty" under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment centered around "liberty of con-
tract" as it helped to protect property rights. It was not until 1925
that the Court began the piece-meal incorporation of first amendment
freedoms into the fourteenth amendment with "establishment" being
the last. ". . . [T]he central issue posed by the twentieth century for
our system of free expression is the development of methods for main-
taining that system, not as a self-adjusting by-product of laissez-faire,
but as a positive and deliberate function of the social process."2 In
1925 the Court proclaimed that free speech was a "liberty" under the
fourteenth amendment.3 It then added the press when it said, "It is
no longer open to doubt that the liberty of press. . . is within the liberty
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth from invasion
by state action." 4 Free assembly attained status next when the Court said,
"The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech
and free press and is equally fundamental." 5 Cantwell v. Connecticut,6
*Associate Professor of Law at De Paul University; J.D., Northwestern Uni-
versity; member of the Illinois Bar.
1 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School District of Abington Township, Pa.
v. Schempp, -U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963).
2 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J.
877, 904 (1963).
3 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
4 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
5 Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).6 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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decided on free exercise grounds, added freedom of religion, and as a
matter of dictum mentioned "establishment" as being included in the
fourteenth. Speech, press, assembly, and the free exercise of religion
became firmly established, usually alone, but sometimes in conjunction,
as fundamental liberties incorporated in due process.
It was not until Everson v. Board of Education7 that the Court
gave any real substance or meaning to the establishment clause, and
then it did so only as a matter of dictum. The basis for the decision
was that "New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise
of their own religion."8 Public welfare benefits cannot be denied to
persons because of what they believe or don't believe. The Court, in
limiting the government's involvement in the establishment of religion,
included:
Neither [referring to a state or the federal government] can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or dis-
belief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attend-
ance or nonattendance. 5 (Material in parenthesis added)
The Court's initial decision, then, as to what elements should be
considered in determining whether there was a law establishing a
religion, included matters which more easily could explain one's right
freely to practice his religious beliefs without coercion or compulsion.
The Court's ultimate ruling was on a free exercise basis.
The Court, in School District of Abizgton Township, Pa. v.
Schempp, definitively stated:
Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in
the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two
clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause viola-
tion need not be so attended. 10
Yet the only three "establishment" cases"- decided by the Court on a
state level had such strong overtones of coercion that one would be
lead to believe that "coercion," the basic element in the free exercise
cases, is also of some importance in "establishment," and that the
Court has yet to decide an establishment case without the prop of "free
exercise" to give it support.
In Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education" pupils not
agreeing to take a course in religious instruction were required to leave
7 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8 Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 15.
10-U.S.--, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1572 (1963).
11 Cases cited note 1 supra.
12 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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the public school classroom in favor of those who desired to attend
classes in religion. Illinois had a compulsory school attendance law.
The case was decided on the basis that the use of school buildings and
of compulsory school machinery to help acquire students violated the
establishment clause. One detects "free exercise" violation in compelling
a student to leave his regular classroom because his beliefs differ from,
and he does not want the religious instruction offered to, those who
remain.
In Zorach v. Clauson,'" decided on the basis that the state did not
violate the establishment clause in allowing students to be dismissed
from class for the purpose of taking religious instruction off the
premises, the Court did not appear to be ignoring the free exercise
clause when it said:
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses.... Gov-
ernment .. .may not use secular institutions to force one or
some religion on any person. . . .The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between the sects. It may
not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious
observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend
church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious in-
struction.14
Appellants had no standing to assert their free exercise claims, but
they did have standing to assert their establishment claim in McGowan
v. Maryland.15 The Court distinguished this case from McCollum,0
the only case in which the establishment clause had been found to be
violated up to that time, by saying that the system of state action in
McCollum "bad the effect of coercing the children to attend religious
classes; no such coercion to attend church services is present in the
situation at bar.' '17 Coercion, an important factor in determining whether
one is being allowed to freely practice his religion, is here used as a basis
for deciding that religion had not been established in one case but had
been established in the other. A law requiring closing on Sunday did
not coerce attendance at religious functions in McGowan, but a released
time program did coerce attendance at religious functions in McCollum.
The Court in the "Regents Prayer Case," Engel v. Vitale, 8 said it
was deciding the case on the establishment clause, but it also said:
This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a
particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of
such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support
of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
1" 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
14 Id. at 313 and 314.
15 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
A 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
17 366 U.S. at 452.
18 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.19
School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp was combined
with Murray v. Curlett and decided by the Supreme Court on June 17,
1963.20 The first involved a Pennsylvania statute requiring Bible reading
in the public schools, and the second concerned a rule adopted pursuant
to a Maryland statute, which required the reading of the Bible or the
Lord's Prayer in the public schools. Testimony had been introduced in
the trial court in Schempp showing that the father of the school children
concerned, a Unitarian, had decided he would not have his children ex-
cused even though a specific provision was made for excusal. He said
he did not wish to have his children's relationships with teachers and
classmates disturbed; that he did not wish to have his children labeled
"odd-balls," "atheists," "communists," or "un-American""1 ; that he
did not wish his children excused because that might cause them to miss
important announcements; and that the children would have to stand in
the hall which might be interpreted as punishment for bad conduct. In
the Maryland case, petitioners, atheists, claimed violation of their re-
ligious liberty. They said the Maryland requirements promoted doubt
as to the morality, good citizenship, and good faith of the petitioners. 22
Coercion was not, however, directly proven as to the individual students
involved in either case.
It is interesting to note aspects of coercion indicated in dicta by the
various justices supporting the ban on the promotion of the religious
exercises in the school. Only Mr. Justice Stewart dissented. The ma-
jority opinion granted that there was no compulsion on the teacher to
read the Bible or recite the Lord's Prayer, but it questioned whether
her contract would be renewed for "violation of school laws. '23 Mr.
Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, said that, "Through the mechanism
of the State, all of the people are being required to finance a religious
exercise that only some of the people want and that violates the sensi-
bilities of others. '24 Mr. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion,
stated that "the complaint in every case thus far challenging an estab-
lishment has set forth at least a colorable claim of infringement of free
exercise" and that the parents had real grievances sufficient to give them
standing even without a showing as to the monetary cost of the exer-
cise.25 Expert testimony was introduced in Schempp to the effect that
29 Id. at 430.
20School District of Abington, Pa. v. Schempp, -U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560
(1963).21Id. at 1564 n.3.
221d. at 1566.
231d. at 1563 n. 2.
24 Id. at 1575.
25 Id. at 1594 n. 30.
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reading portions of the New Testament, without explanation, tended to
bring the Jews into ridicule or scorn.
20
The majority opinion in Schempp says that "to withstand the stric-
tures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative pur-
pose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 27
Granted that this is a test for determining whether a law has been passed
establishing a religion, it is difficult to see how, if the law did have a
primary effect of inhibiting religion, it would not also impair, to some
degree, the religious freedom of those professing to follow the religion
inhibited. To the extent that one's religion is stultified, weakened, or
impaired, his ability to practice his religion to the fullest extent, using
all its resources, would be impaired. A religion consists of the common
beliefs of the individuals pursuing the same. To the extent that it is
frustrated by state action, so are all those persons frustrated who pro-
fess to promote and advance that religion. Restraint of the whole is
restraint of its component parts.
Mr. Justice Brennan's separate concurrence attempts the answer as
to whether Schempp can be answered solely on the basis of the estab-
lishment clause or whether the excusal provision calls for a decision
under the free exercise clause. His opinion would seem to assume a
dichotomy between the two clauses, with a consideration of both being
necessary, however, when there is a provision for excusing the child
from the religious services. He says that reading the Bible and reciting
the Lord's Prayer are religious practices designed "at least in part to
achieve religious aims through the use of public school facilities during
the school day" and that "the availability of excusal or exemption has
no relevance to the establishment question." 28 If there had been no ex-
cusal privilege, "free exercise" would have become enmeshed with "es-
tablishment" since the children would have to participate against their
will, at least silently, in a religious exercise ordered by governmental
authority.
Where there is excusal, the exercise of the privilege, since it re-
quires a public expression of disbelief, before the constitutional rights
of abstention can be exercised, violates "free exercise." The requiring
of conditions, however innocent or harmless, before one can exercise
a constitutional right, is impermissible. It tends, certainly in the case of
children who as a group tend to conform, to place the children in a
dilemma. If they exercise their constitutional right to be excused, they
are labeled as at least questionable. If they forego the constitutional
right, they will receive acceptance of the group. This would tend to
discriminate against and make unequal those excused. Further, where
26 Id. at 1564.
27 Id. at 1571.
28 Id. at 1606.
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the right to be excused is of a constitutional nature, the children should
not have to avail themselves of the excusal procedure and find it inade-
quate before they can claim the right.2 9 These are the arguments Mr.
Justice Brennan advances to show excusal cannot be required con-
stitutionally without violating the free exercise clause. Whether excusal
or not, the two clauses should be considered together in this type of
case. Where the student can't be excused, he has no alternative, and co-
ercion is present. Where he can be excused, he has an unconstitutional
alternative, and coercion and pressure are present. "The right to be let
alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men."
30
The Schempp majority recognizes a number of permissible religious
practices that are publicly sponsored or paid for.2 ' But it is Mr. Justice
Brennan's lengthy concurring opinion, setting forth the neutrality posi-
tion, which illustrates how coercion considerations may outweigh es-
tablishment considerations in determining that certain forms of aid are
permissible.
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurrence, contrasted with Mr. Justice
Douglas' concurrence in Engel v. Vitale3 setting forth the absolutist
position, may be at least a partial explanation for the quiet public ac-
ceptance of Schempp as compared to the angry public disapproval of
Engel.
Churches and chaplains at military installations, draft exemption
for ministers, and excusal of children on their religious holidays are
probably the prime examples of the interaction of "establishment" and
"free exercise." Abolish the practice and religious freedom suffers. Re-
ligious freedom does not here give way to the establishment clause. 3
Prayers before governmental bodies involve mature adults who can
absent themselves without penalty, direct or indirect.3- Lack of com-
pulsion and grown individuals, as opposed to children attending school
under compulsory laws with the threat of not being accepted if they do
not conform, make the difference. Teaching about religion, rather than
teaching religion, is permissible since "to impose rigid limits upon the
mention of God or references to the Bible in the classroom would be
fraught with dangers."'25 Tax deductions benefiting nonprofit organi-
zations, including religious institutions, are permissible.'6 Denying tax
exemption to religious nonprofit organizations and to individuals con-
tributing to such organizations might very well be discriminatory as to
29 Id. at 1606-1609.
30 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
1-U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. at 1566.
32370 U.S. at 437.
"3-U.S.--, 83 Sup. Ct. at 1610-1612.
'4 Id. at 1612.
35 Id. at 1613.36 Id. at 1613.
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the organization because it is religious and as to the individual because
of his religious beliefs.
Mr. Justice Brennan recognizes "incidental aids to individual wor-
shippers which come about as products of general and nondiscriminatory
welfare programs,"3 as for example, extending unemployment benefits
to individuals who become unemployed because of religious beliefs. To
deny these persons benefits would be to jeopardize their religious free-
dom in order to avoid establishing their beliefs by granting them un-
employment compensation because they uphold those beliefs.38
Mr. Justice Goldberg, with Mr. Justice Harlan concurring, may
well have explained the true nature of the religious guarantees:
The First Amendment guarantees, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, foreclose not only laws
'respecting an establishment of religion' but also those 'prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.' These two proscriptions are to be read
together, and in light of the single end which they are designed
to serve. The basic purpose of the First Amendment is to pro-
mote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty
and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure
the best hope of attainment of that end.39
One of the last cases decided at the last term of Court"0 concerned
itself with an employee discharged from her employment because she
refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. She filed a
claim for unemployment compensation benefits, having failed to obtain
employment because her religious scruples forbade her taking Saturday
work. Her claim was-denied. The Court decided the case solely on free
exercise grounds finding that she was ineligible because of the practice
of her religious beliefs, pressure on her to forego her religious practice
being apparent. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice White in
dissent, found direct financial assistance to religion and a violation of
the establishment clause with no compulsion.4' It is worth noting that
the dissent in a dictum found "coercion" was an important factor in
Engel and Schempp which cases it cited in stating: "The State violates
its obligation of neutrality when ... it mandates a daily religious exer-
cise in its public schools, with all the attendant pressures on the school
children that such an exercise entails. 42
The Court has never adequately explained why "establishment" is a
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment. It may be that its
doubts in that regard are responsible for the slow maturation of the
establishment clause. Its uncertainties may explain why in only three
37 Id. at 1613.
38 Id. at 1614.
39 Id. at 1615.
40 Sherbert v. Verner, -U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1790 (1963).
41 Id. at 1801.
42 Id. at 1804.
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cases has the' clause been used to invalidate state action, and then only
where strong overtones of coercion, a facet of "free exercise," were
present. Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Schempp is an
attempted answer to arguments that "establishment" cannot logically
be incorporated in the fourteenth amendment. It is significant that he
felt it advisable to present answers at this late date, 23 years after
Cantwell first indicated it was a protected liberty.
It was argued that the framers of the establishment clause meant to
deny any right on the part of Congress to disestablish state churches.
43
Mr. Justice Brennan's answer in Schempp is that state establishments
were all dissolved at the time the fourteenth amendment was ratified,
and the framers of that amendment could not be deemed to have less
desire to absorb the establishment clause than the free exercise clause.
44
Corwin has said that: "So far as the Fourteenth is concerned, states
are entirely free to establish religions provided they do not deprive
anyone of religious liberty. It is only liberty that the Fourteenth pro-
tects. ' 45 Mr. Justice Brennan answers: "The fallacy in this contention
... is that it underestimates the role of the Establishment Clause as a
coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. ' 4 6 He
further says there is "a freedom from such state governmental involve-
ment in the affairs of religion as the Establishment Clause had originally
foreclosed on the part of Congress.
4 7
The argument has been made that the states may furnish numerous
forms of aid provided there is no formal establishment. The Justice goes
back to 1853 to Senate Committee Reports to show that it was the
understanding at that time that many forms of aid falling short of actual
formal establishment are not permissible.
48
The above arguments may indicate justification for status being
given to the establishment clause equal to other first amendment clauses,
but there are immeasurably stronger and better clarified precedents in
"coercion" and "free exercise." Could it not be that the Court's initial
incursions into the field in Cantwell, Everson and McCollum reflected
the preferred position emphasizing the firstness of the first amendment
which a majority of the Court accepted from 1943 to 1948? The Court,
having encompassed the other provisions of the first amendment within
the fourteenth, and having given them preferred status, could have used
Everson and McCollum to round out the first amendment in its rela-
tionship to the fourteenth. It then receded from the preferred position
43Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH.
U. L. Q. 371, 373-394.
4--U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. at 1589.
4 Corwin, The Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3, 19 (1949).
4r _U.S.., 83 Sup. Ct. at 1589.
471d. at 1589.
48 Id. at 1591 n. 24.
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leaving "establishment" as part of the fourteenth amendment not com-
pletely divorced from "free exercise."
Engel49 and Schempp indicate a policy of weakened standing re-
quirements in "establishment" cases. Coercion must be alleged and
proved in a free exercise clause case but not in an establishment clause
case. Although coercion is present in the latter type of case and bolsters
and strenghthens the grounds for establishment violation, proof is not
required. The day may not be far distant when allegation and proof of
"establishment," totally devoid of any background of coercion, will be
sufficient to eliminate the practice complained of. The establishment
clause will then have matured. It is doubtful, however, that the praying
mantis will summarily be ordered out of the biology laboratory as was
done, tongue in cheek, in Chicago schools recently.50
49 Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HAMv. L. REV. 25 (1962).50 Newsweek, July 1, 1963, p. 48.
